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that this can be explained by a time lag in implementation. For example, orders ~~must~~ presumably have to be given to a number of supervisors, plans must then have to be drawn, directions conveyed to technicians and workmen, etc. In addition, facilities for packing, removal and shipping must be made available pursuant to some over-all time phased plan. Conceivably all of such factors and others could act in such a way as to cause a time lag in implementing Khrushchev's order.



2. There may be duplicity on the part of the Soviets.

This duplicity could, of course, extend to a planned surprise usage of the missiles against the US. This we would consider to be extremely remote under the circumstances. However, there could be duplicity in another sense which is far more creditable. Having advanced concessions highly acceptable to the West it would not be out of character with previous history of dealing

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with the Soviets for them to revert to a conscious effort of procrastination. The object of such an effort would be to whittle away at the Western position without overtly appearing to do so. Indeed by mere inaction or even very slow movement the Sovietu benefit from a sharp diminishing lack of momentum ~~at~~ in the US position. Moreover, it is possible and even likely that various outside pressures would in these circumstances begin to be felt by the US. The UN, neutrals and even Allies might be expected to bring pressure upon the US for patience and for not pushing the Russians too hard. As a result if the Soviets can manage to stall beyond the immediate period of heightened tensions they might be able to derive important benefits without appearing to have in any way attempted to do so. At the same time, of course, if US pressure is continued and intensified they can always speed up their actions without having lost any more face than is already the case.



3. Castro. Complications. It is possible that Castro is resisting Soviet concessions made to the US. At a minimum, one would expect that the Cubans would do everything possible to extract commitments from the Soviets concerning future political,

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economic and military ~~paralleled~~ relationships. While the
negotiating Castro ~~position~~ is not strong, assuming that the Soviets are
anxious to retrench from their extended position vis-a-vis the
US they would presumably be anxious not to have the Cubans throw
a monkey wrench into the works. Certainly if the Cubans insisted
on resisting inspection, if necessary at the point of military
hostilities, or even conceivably (but we would assume remotely so)
they threaten to attempt to seize the already operational *missile* sites,
this might well give the Soviets pause. In any event, it could
complicate the ease with which the disassembling operation, which
itself would presumably in part be dependent upon Cuban labor,
could be gotten under way.



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
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CONCLUSION.

The conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing is that we should at once reinstitute a heavy aerial reconnaissance taking



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